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Korea-US Free Trade Revisited
INBOM CHOI AND JEFFREY J. SCHOTT 
Two years ago, we published an analysis of the costs and benefits of ne-
gotiating a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between South Korea and
the United States (Choi and Schott 2001). Neither government had pro-
posed such an initiative, but it was under active discussion by business
leaders and academics in both countries. The study concluded that
 economic welfare gains for both countries would be significant, if all
sectors—including agriculture—were covered by the obligations;
 deep-rooted political opposition to specific reforms existed in both
countries;
 the FTA would generate substantial trade diversion, particularly af-
fecting suppliers in Japan and China; and
 an FTA could induce a series of counterbalancing initiatives among
other East Asian countries in response to the expected discrimination
in the US and Korean markets.
For the United States, the main benefits of the FTA would derive from
modest welfare gains (resulting primarily from improved terms of trade);
from the likely catalytic effect of the Korea-US accord on trade liberaliza-
tion in the region as Taiwan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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(ASEAN), and possibly Japan sought comparable pacts; and from the
support the trade initiative could give to promoting growth and stability
on the Korean peninsula. For Korea, the FTA would induce much larger
welfare gains as the country implemented domestic economic reforms
pursuant to its FTA obligations (such reforms are needed in any event but
would be hard to enact in the face of strident political opposition in Korea
absent a payoff of US concessions that improve access for Korean ex-
porters to the US market); would counter trade diversion suffered by Ko-
rean exporters as a result of other US preferential trade pacts (especially
the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA); and would pro-
vide additional incentives for foreign investors in the Korean economy.
These findings led us to recommend that “if the United States and Korea
want to maximize both welfare gains and political comity in the Asia-
Pacific region, the preferred trade strategy should be to concurrently pur-
sue trade reforms bilaterally, in APEC [the Asia Pacific Economic Cooper-
ation forum] and in WTO negotiations” (Choi and Schott 2001, 79–82).
Over the past two years, the trade environment has changed signifi-
cantly, creating new opportunities but also posing irksome new chal-
lenges to prospective Korea-US negotiations. First, the launch of the Doha
Round negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November
2001 revived prospects for global trade reforms that had been dormant
since the failed Seattle WTO ministerial in 1999. The passage of US trade
promotion authority (TPA) in August 2002 provided US officials with the
congressional mandate and negotiating flexibility needed to pursue com-
prehensive trade agreements in bilateral, regional, and multilateral fo-
rums (provided the agreements cover broad-ranging rights and obliga-
tions and produce balanced results in certain import-sensitive sectors).
That authority already has been applied to ratify and implement FTAs
negotiated with Singapore and Chile, and could be used to facilitate a
Korea-US FTA. Indeed, the US International Trade Commission has al-
ready been asked by Congress to study the economic implications of a
comparable agreement with Korea; it issued conclusions (USITC 2001) in
September 2001 similar to those reported by Choi and Schott (2001).
Second, the international trade environment has become more unset-
tled, especially from a Korean point of view. The Doha Round is travers-
ing rough shoals, with talks threatening to stall on the contentious issue of
agricultural reform. While Korea studies its FTA options, its competitors
in East Asia have begun to negotiate. Most prominent among the new ini-
tiatives is the China-ASEAN free trade talks. The prospect of a broad “10
plus 1” pact has in turn provoked Japan to pursue a comparable initiative;
in addition, Japan launched FTA negotiations with Mexico in late 2002.
Discussions among the even broader grouping of ASEAN and Northeast
Asian countries, the “10 plus 3,” seem far removed from concrete trade
negotiations—though the prospect of such a regional trading powerhouse
excites the imagination of many Korean policymakers. Whether China
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wants any part of that game is another story. More ominously, the flare-up
of North-South tensions on the Korean peninsula raises the political risk
premium of investment in Korea; conversely, however, that threat also re-
inforces interest in deepening trade ties as part of a broader strategy to
strengthen economic and political stability in the region.
Third, developments in the bilateral economic relationship also have
generated mixed signals about the desire to move into FTA negotiations.
On the one hand, there have been important US investments in the Ko-
rean economy, including the purchase of Daewoo by General Motors. On
the other hand, some trade disputes, notably over steel, have become
more contentious. Perhaps more telling is the rapid growth in Korea-
China trade, which stands in stark contrast to the basically flat growth
rates of Korea-US trade over the past two years. In sum, the decision to
launch FTA negotiations between the United States and Korea now in-
volves a much more complicated calculus than it did just two years ago.
This chapter offers a reappraisal of the economic and political benefits
and costs of pursuing a bilateral Korea-US FTA. It examines the current sta-
tus of bilateral trade and investment, as well as the range of trade frictions
that could be resolved by an FTA—but that at the same time pose practical
obstacles to such a negotiation. We then analyze the potential benefits of an
FTA, drawing on both computable general equilibrium and gravity mod-
els to suggest parameters of the potential trade and welfare gains for each
country. The next section addresses the potential costs of an agreement, in
terms both of trade diversion from other suppliers in East Asia and of pos-
sible distractions from ongoing WTO negotiations. We conclude with near-
term prospects for trade negotiations and policy recommendations.
Bilateral Trade and Investment
Among all the countries with which the United States is either negoti-
ating or seriously considering an FTA, Korea is the one with which it has
the most extensive trade relationship. Two-way merchandise trade to-
taled $56 billion in 2002, with the United States running a bilateral trade
deficit of $14 billion. In addition, bilateral trade in services reached almost
$11 billion in 2001. Agricultural products in 2002 accounted for less than
5 percent of total trade but represented 11.6 percent of US exports to Ko-
rea (see tables 7.1 and 7.2). Overall, Korea ranked as the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner in 2002.
The United States remains Korea’s most important trading partner, ac-
counting for 20.2 percent of Korean exports and 15.1 percent of Korean
imports in 2002. To be sure, trade with China (including Hong Kong) is
growing rapidly; in fact, China edged out the United States as Korea’s
largest export market in 2002. Imports from the United States still exceed
those from China, but Chinese suppliers are catching up quickly at the ex-
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pense of both US and Japanese companies (see table 7.3). Japan remains
the leading source of imports, but the Japanese share of the Korean mar-
ket has steadily eroded from a peak of 41 percent in 1971 to less than 20
percent for the past few years. These dramatic shifts in market share ex-
plain in part Korea’s growing interest in a regional trade pact with China
at the same time that it continues to study potential FTAs with Japan and
the United States.
Over the past decade, manufactured goods have accounted for about 60
percent of US exports of goods and services to Korea (mainly electrical
machinery and equipment, aircraft, scientific equipment, and organic
chemicals), and 80 percent of Korean exports to the United States (pri-
marily autos, telecommunications equipment, semiconductors, comput-
ers and parts, and apparel). Interestingly, 30 percent of total Korea-US
trade in 2002 was in Harmonized Tariff Schedule chapter 85: electrical
machinery and equipment (mainly semiconductors and computers and
parts). In the case of computer chips trade, the two countries show a clear
pattern of intraindustry trade: the United States exports high-tech pro-
cessors and chips, and Korea mainly exports memory chips.
Indeed, Korea’s intraindustry trade has steadily increased over the
years, with the extent of such trade with the United States somewhat less
than that with its other global trading partners. This trend has important
implications, since a given expansion of intraindustry trade is generally
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Table 7.1 US trade with Korea, 1995–2002 (millions of dollars)
Product 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
US exports to Korea
Agriculture 2,946 3,231 2,305 1,761 2,261 2,252 2,264 2,449
Share of total (percent) 12.0 12.7 9.5 11.0 10.3 8.6 10.8 11.6
Total merchandise 24,480 25,430 24,290 15,980 22,040 26,300 20,900 21,150
US imports from Korea
Agriculture 176 176 183 155 180 203 224 248
Share of total (percent) 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7
Total merchandise 24,030 22,530 22,940 23,700 31,150 39,830 34,920 35,280
US trade volume with Korea
(exports plus imports)
Agriculture 3,122 3,407 2,488 1,916 2,441 2,455 2,488 2,697
Share of total (percent) 6.4 7.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 3.7 4.5 4.8
Total merchandise 48,510 47,960 47,230 39,680 53,190 66,130 55,820 56,430
US trade balance with Korea
(exports minus imports)
Agriculture 2,770 3,055 2,122 1,606 2,081 2,049 2,040 2,201
Total merchandise 450 2,900 1,350 –7,720 –9,110 –13,530 –14,020 –14,130
Note: “Agriculture” is defined as chapters 1–24 in the Harmonized Schedule.
Source: US International Trade Commission Trade Database, http://dataweb.usitc.gov.
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thought to pose fewer adjustment problems and subsequently fewer trade
conflicts than intraindustry trade.
In addition to its role in trade, the United States has been the largest
source of foreign direct investment in Korea (see table 7.4). The stock of
US FDI in Korea reached $10 billion by year-end 2001 and should be
valued even higher when flows related to the recent purchase of Daewoo
by General Motors are included in the statistics.1 That investment exem-
plifies an important shift in US corporate involvement in the Korean
economy. In the past, US investors usually took minority stakes in joint
ventures because of restrictions on fully owned subsidiaries or majority-
owned companies. Liberalization of investment laws and regulations
since the 1997 economic crisis has helped to encourage more substantial
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Table 7.2 US-Korea trade by major product, 2001–02 
(millions of dollars, percent of total)
2001 2002
Industry Value Share Value Share
US imports from Korea
Agricultural and food products 223.4 0.6 247.4 0.7
Minerals and chemicals 1,077.4 3.1 832.3 2.4
Textiles and apparel 1,383.5 4.0 2,032.2 5.8
Goods related to transportation 7,095.5 20.3 7,528.7 21.3
Other manufactured goods 24,395.4 69.9 23,879.2 67.7
Special categories 742.0 2.1 764.0 2.2
Goods subtotal 34,917.2 100.0 35,283.8 100.0
Services 3,765.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 38,862.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
US exports to Korea
Agricultural and food products 2,264.4 10.9 2,449.4 11.6
Minerals and chemicals 2,412.1 11.6 2,572.6 12.2
Textiles and apparel 304.8 1.5 271.9 1.3
Goods related to transportation 3,050.6 14.6 2,756.8 13.1
Other manufactured goods 12,423.8 59.7 12,624.2 59.9
Special categories 371.8 1.8 406.6 1.9
Goods subtotal 20,827.5 100.0 21,081.5 100.0
Services 7,121.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 27,948.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. = not available
Sources: US International Trade Commission Trade Database, http://dataweb.usitc.gov; the
Office of Textile and Apparel, http://otexa.ita.doc.gov; and the US Department of Commerce
Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.doc.gov.
1. General Motors Group (including GM, Suzuki, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp.)
holds a 67 percent share in GM Daewoo Auto & Technology Company. The remainder is
held by Daewoo Motors Creditors Committee. General Motors (US) paid $251 million for its
42.1 percent share of the new company in October 2002 (correspondence from GM Corpo-
ration, May 2003).
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US investments; the GM deal and the purchase by Newbridge Capital of
Korea First Bank are the most ambitious of these.2 Locking in those re-
forms and complementing them with the types of investor protections in-
cluded in the Singapore and Chile FTAs with the United States would be
high priorities for US negotiators of an FTA with Korea.
Bilateral Trade Frictions
Any trade relationship as sizable as that between the United States and
Korea will naturally provoke a number of bilateral frictions. Such dis-
putes highlight both the problem areas in the trade relationship and some
of the most significant opportunities to expand trade, if an FTA can re-
move existing legal and regulatory obstacles. Both countries publish an-
nual laundry lists of complaints by their domestic industries covering
trade barriers, discriminatory standards, and tax and procurement poli-
cies, among other areas.3 In addition, the American Chamber of Com-
merce in Korea releases an annual report on bilateral trade relations.
The United States has an extensive litany of complaints about Korean
trade and regulatory practices that impede trade and investment by US
firms. The list compiled by the Office of the US Trade Representative ex-
tends 24 pages in its 2003 report on foreign trade barriers—longer than
that for any other country in the FTA queue and exceeded only by the lists 
for Japan, China, and the European Union! The good news is that a num-
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Table 7.3 Korea’s major trading partners, 1995–2002 
(share of trade in percent)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Exports to
United States 19.3 16.7 15.9 17.3 20.6 21.9 20.8 20.2
Japan 13.6 12.1 10.9 9.3 11.1 11.9 11.0 9.3
China 7.3 8.8 10.0 9.0 9.6 10.7 12.1 14.7
China + Hong Kong 15.9 17.3 18.6 16.1 15.9 17.0 18.4 20.9
Imports from
United States 22.5 22.2 20.8 21.9 20.8 18.3 15.9 15.1
Japan 24.2 21.0 19.2 18.0 20.1 19.9 18.9 19.6
China 5.5 5.7 7.0 6.9 7.4 8.0 9.4 11.4
China + Hong Kong 6.1 6.5 7.6 7.5 8.1 8.8 10.3 12.6
Source: Korean Customs Department, www.customs.go.kr/hp/homepage/eng/index05.htm.
2. Completion of the long-standing negotiation of a bilateral investment treaty, which contin-
ues to be stalled over disputes regarding Korean screen quotas, could boost FDI even more.
3. The US Congress requires the US Trade Representative to issue an annual National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. In the spirit of reciprocity, the Korean Foreign Min-
istry publishes an annual Foreign Trade Environment report that reviews foreign trade policies
and practices that are considered detrimental to Korean export interests.
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ber of problems have either been mitigated by the implementation of
Uruguay Round tariff reforms or resolved through bilateral agreements
(including the long-running dispute over Korean beef imports). The bad
news is that many more problems remain, affecting billions of dollars of
bilateral trade.4
The most enduring and prominent problems involve the auto sector,
semiconductors, and agriculture. Restrictions on the import and sale of
autos in Korea remain a source of major concern for US firms. Tariffs on
autos (8 percent) are about the same as the average levies on manufac-
tured goods, but the sale of American cars is further constrained by sales
taxes (based on engine displacement) that burden large vehicles (primar-
ily imports) much more than small, domestically produced cars. As a re-
sult, auto imports account for less than 1 percent of domestic consump-
tion in Korea. Past disputes over semiconductors also seem to be heating
up, as subsidies provided by the Korean government to help restructure
its industry provoke new countervailing duty (CVD) complaints in the
United States. In April 2003, the US Commerce Department issued a pre-
liminary determination that imports from Hynix Semiconductor are liable
to CVDs of more than 50 percent (Financial Times, April 2, 2003, 15). Other
US concerns involve such areas as screen-time quotas, burdensome regu-
lations in financial service sectors, and pharmaceutical pricing practices
(see USTR 2003, 239–63).
In agriculture, Korea still maintains very restrictive access to its rice
market. Other farm imports face an average tariff of 62 percent, though
tariffs on forestry and fishery products are not bound in the WTO and
thus can be increased at any time without violating Korean trade obliga-
tions. Some products of export interest to the United States (e.g., oranges)
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4. Choi and Schott (2001, table 3.4) estimated that bilateral disputes covered $1.85 billion 
in US imports from Korea, and $2.5 billion in US exports to Korea in 1999. These figures in-
clude the now-resolved beef dispute but do not take into account the recent US steel import
restraints.
Table 7.4 FDI stock in Korea, 1995–2002 (millions of dollars)
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Stock of US FDI 
in Korea 5,557 6,508 6,467 7,365 7,474 8,968 10,524 12,192
Stock of world FDI 
in Korea 9,451 12,422 12,526 19,043 32,143 37,106 40,767 43,689
US share 
(percent) 58.8 52.4 51.6 38.7 23.3 24.2 25.8 27.9
Stock of US FDI 
in world 699,015 795,195 871,316 1,000,703 1,215,960 1,316,247 1,383,225 1,520,965
Share in Korea 
(percent) 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
Sources: The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.doc.gov; and UNCTAD, World
Investment Report, Geneva, various issues.
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are subject to tariff-rate quotas with overquota tariffs of 60 percent. In ad-
dition, customs clearance red tape and sanitary and phytosanitary certifi-
cation requirements continue to plague importers of US farm products.
Koreans’ main concerns are that the United States uses antidumping
(AD) actions and countervailing duties overzealously and in contraven-
tion of WTO obligations, and that it maintains high tariffs on some prod-
ucts of major export interest to Korea. The tariff peaks protect a number
of textiles, apparel, footwear, and luggage products. Despite those high
levies, Korean exports totaled about $400 million in 1999, or 10 percent of
total US imports of these products (see Choi and Schott 2001, table 3.1).
Exporters of these products would be a major beneficiary of a bilateral
FTA, though the value of the FTA preferences would depend on whether
US tariff reforms are extended on a most favored nation basis, as pro-
posed in the Doha Round.
The problem with antidumping actions is harder to reconcile, either 
in a bilateral FTA or in WTO negotiations. As of April 2003, there were 23
US antidumping and CVD measures in effect against Korean exporters.
US antidumping and countervail orders against Korean firms represent
only 6.7 percent of all current US orders (compared to Korea’s 3 percent
share of total US imports). Interestingly, all but five of these orders involve
iron and steel products, and almost all US orders implemented during the
past decade are against iron and steel products (see table 7.5). It is only a
slight exaggeration to say that Korea really does not have an antidumping
problem with the United States; rather, it has a big steel trade problem.
The steel trade problem involves both AD and CVD cases and US safe-
guard measures. Korean producers, which were affected by US safeguard
actions against line pipe imports in February 2000, were a major target of
the broader US steel safeguards in March 2002.5 As a result, the volume of
Korean steel exports to the United States in 2002 fell 16 percent from 2001
levels (and about 40 percent from their peak in 1998), with most of the
losses coming from flat and long steel products that were subject to im-
mediate 30 percent tariffs. However, the US protection was attenuated in
part by product exclusions from the safeguard measures.6 Korea brought
and won complaints in the WTO against both safeguard actions (though
the latest decision is under appeal).
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5. The 2000 safeguard measure imposed a tariff-rate quota that allowed each non-NAFTA
supplier to export 9,000 short tons of line pipe to the United States; overquota imports were
subject to a 19 percent tariff. As a result, Korea’s exports in 2000 fell by two-thirds from their
1999 levels. Korea filed a WTO complaint, but by the time the case was fully adjudicated and
Korea and the United States had reached a mutually acceptable settlement, the line pipe
safeguard was only six months away from its scheduled expiration.
6. POSCO—the principal Korean steel producer—was the largest beneficiary of the product
exclusions to the global steel safeguard, in part so it could supply unfinished steel to a mill
owned by US Steel in California.
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Bilateral Disputes in the WTO
Since the WTO entered into force in January 1995 with its new dispute set-
tlement procedures, the United States and Korea have filed 12 cases—6 by
each country—involving bilateral trade problems. Not surprisingly, the
US cases have involved problems with nontariff agricultural protection-
ism, which generally have been settled in favor of the US side (either 
by mutual agreement or by WTO panel ruling). One other case dealt 
with procurement problems associated with the construction of the new
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Table 7.5 US antidumping and countervailing duty cases against
Korea (in effect as of April 2003)
Product Industry Date ordered
US antidumping orders
Malleable cast-iron pipe fittings Iron/steel May 1986
Top-of-the-stove stainless steel cooking ware Miscellaneous January 1987
Industrial nitrocellulose Chemicals July 1990
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) film Chemicals June 1991
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe Iron/steel November 1992
Welded ASTM A-312 stainless steel pipe Iron/steel December 1992
Stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings Iron/steel February 1993
Corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products Iron/steel August 1993
Oil country tubular goods Iron/steel August 1995
Stainless steel wire rod Iron/steel September 1998
Stainless steel plate in coils Iron/steel May 1999
Stainless steel sheet and strip Iron/steel July 1999
Carbon steel plate Iron/steel February 2000
Polyester staple fiber Miscellaneous May 2000
Structural steel beams Iron/steel August 2000
Steel concrete reinforcing bar Iron/steel September 2001
Stainless steel angle Iron/steel May 2001
Stainless steel bar Iron/steel March 2002
US countervailing duties
Top-of-the-stove stainless steel cooking ware Miscellaneous January 1987
Corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products Iron/steel August 1993
Stainless steel sheet and strip Iron/steel August 1999
Carbon steel plate Iron/steel February 2000
Structural steel beams Iron/steel August 2000
Summary:
Total orders Steel orders
Total US orders in effect 341 Total US orders on steel in effect 193
US orders against Korea 23 US orders against Korea on steel 18
Korean share of orders Korean share of orders on steel 
(percent) 6.7 (percent) 9.3
Korean share of US goods Korean share of US steel 
imports, 2002 (percent) 3.1 imports, 2002 (percent) 5.3
Sources: US International Trade Commission, www.usitc.gov; USITC Trade Database,
http:// dataweb.usitc.gov; and US Census Bureau, FTD Steel Imports Trade Data, www.cen-
sus. gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/steel_index.html.
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Inchon airport, and the WTO panel ruled that the matter fell beyond
Korea’s obligations in the WTO government procurement agreement. The
Korean cases dealt with problems with the conduct of US antidumping
and safeguard investigations, and the WTO panels generally supported
Korea’s complaints (see table 7.6).
These cases provide further evidence that antidumping actions and
agriculture continue to pose the most enduring obstacles to bilateral trade
and the negotiation of an FTA. Neither issue can likely be fully resolved
in the context of a bilateral agreement. But precedents from NAFTA and
other FTA negotiations suggest that some special treatment under US
laws could be provided to FTA partners (as is now done for safeguards
cases in NAFTA), and targeted agricultural reforms could be imple-
mented (if accompanied by compensatory domestic income transfers).
Potential Benefits of a Korea-US FTA
Korea and the United States could derive many potential economic and
noneconomic benefits from a bilateral FTA. Economic benefits include
expansion of trade and associated welfare gains, more secure access to 
the other market, and other long-run dynamic effects stemming from in-
creased investment and incentives to implement additional economic re-
forms. Noneconomic benefits include better management of bilateral eco-
nomic relations between the two governments and the strengthening of
their political and security relationship.
Expansion of Trade Between Korea and the United States
To the extent that border and regulatory barriers distort trade and invest-
ment flows and thus impede growth, one should expect an FTA to in-
crease trade between the partner countries. How much? To set parameters
on the possible aggregate trade effects, we deployed both gravity and
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.
Results from the gravity model analysis show that although the two
countries already are very much integrated in trade, bilateral trade ex-
pansion is still possible. The analysis also shows that for the last several
years of the 1990s, trade integration between Korea and the United States
weakened. Perhaps some exports lost their competitiveness and therefore
lost market share in the other market. Or perhaps some exports fell be-
cause trade barriers rose, or some exporters decided to sell their products
elsewhere because of continuing barriers to bilateral trade. Whatever the
explanation, the underperformance of the two countries’ bilateral trade
implies that the United States and Korea have some room for improve-
ment through an FTA.
182 FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Institute for International Economics  |  www.iie.com
To understand the potential economic impact of a preferential trading
arrangement between the United States and Korea, we performed an
analysis using the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model. In our
analysis, we simulated the formation of a free trade agreement under the
assumption that all tariffs (or only nonagricultural tariffs) are removed
between the United States and Korea. One of the findings from this analy-
sis is that Korea and the United States could expect a significant increase
in their bilateral trade volume as a result of forming an FTA. In the case of
full liberalization including agriculture, US exports to Korea would in-
crease by 46 percent in the medium run and 49 percent in the long run,
while US imports from Korea would increase by 26 percent and 30 per-
cent, respectively. John Gilbert (2003) also confirms the same result of
trade expansion, showing that US exports to Korea would increase by 48
percent and US imports from Korea would increase by 23 percent as a re-
sult of a Korea-US FTA.
Welfare Improvement
Increased bilateral trade does not necessarily mean that there are net wel-
fare gains in both economies; if welfare losses due to trade diversion ex-
ceed the gains from bilateral trade expansion, then the countries could be
worse off. In fact, our analysis shows that the formation of an FTA would
lead to a significant trade diversion for Korea and the United States. Over-
all, however, the trade pact would be welfare enhancing for both coun-
tries (even in the case of partial liberalization excluding agriculture). The
absolute welfare gains are evenly allocated across both economies, in the
range of $1.5 billion to $8.9 billion for the United States and $1.7 billion to
$10.8 billion for Korea.7 As the much smaller economy, Korea obviously
has proportionally more to gain. Thus, net welfare gains would range
from 0.02 percent to 0.13 percent of GDP for the United States and from
0.38 percent to 2.41 percent of GDP for Korea. It is important to note that
these results are probably lower-bound estimates of the impact of an FTA:
the model does not capture service protection data, which may be a major
potential source of welfare gains.
The welfare gains from a Korea-US FTA derive from different effects in
the two economies. In the US case, most of the gains are from improve-
ments in the terms of trade. These improvements reflect the benefits of
export expansion into the Korean market. Allocative efficiency gains or
losses are small, reflecting the relatively low distortion levels in the US
economy. In contrast, terms-of-trade effects are less significant for Korea
and in some cases are negative. Negative terms-of-trade effects indicate a
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7. These figures are expressed in 1995 dollars as generated by the model. For details of the
analysis, see Choi and Schott (2001).
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cost from trade diversion being imposed on the Korean economy. For
Korea, the largest gains come from improvements in allocative efficiency—
essentially the Vinerian trade creation effect: the benefit associated with
replacing inefficient domestic production with imports. This result sug-
gests that Korea has less to gain from an FTA with the United States than
from unilateral liberalization. In fact, Gilbert (2003) shows that allocative
efficiency gains for Korea are three times greater from unilateral free trade
than from an FTA with the United States, and that the total welfare gain
is 67 percent higher.
Another important finding is that the potential gains of a Korea-US FTA
are reduced by more than half for both economies if agriculture is ex-
cluded from the agreement. This result reflects both the importance of
agricultural market access for the United States and the potential effi-
ciency gains from agricultural trade reform in Korea.
More Secure Market Access
Another key economic benefit from an FTA is gaining more secure access
to the other market. This objective is particularly important for Korea,
since shipments to the United States account for about 20 percent of total
Korean exports (equivalent to about 7 percent of Korean GDP).
To secure better access to the US market, Korean trade officials place
priority on the development of FTA disciplines on contingent protection
measures, just as the Canadians did in their FTA negotiations in the 1980s.
Canadian manufacturers were particularly concerned that the imposition
of antidumping and countervailing duties made access to the US market
uncertain and created disincentives for investment in Canada.8 Korea
finds itself in a comparable situation; indeed, many Korean exports al-
ready have their access to the US market inhibited by antidumping and
countervailing duties and by safeguard measures. One difference, how-
ever, is that Canada and Mexico now get preferential treatment from the
United States in safeguard cases (though not in AD or CVD cases) under
special rules that apply to NAFTA signatories.9 As a result, Canada and
Mexico were exempted from recent US steel safeguards. Korea obviously
would like similar protection for its exporters.
Long-Run Dynamic Effects
To this point, we have dealt primarily with tariff liberalization, but an FTA
would cover a broader array of trade reforms. In addition to eliminating
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tariffs, an FTA would also cover a wide range of nontariff barriers and
other economic issues, including investment, standards, rules of origin,
government procurement, intellectual property rights, and competition
policy. A liberalized investment regime and service trade would unleash
higher efficiency and productivity, generating faster growth for both
economies. Therefore, an FTA would have a positive, long-run dynamic
effect. For example, increased direct investment from the United States
and new industrial alliances would enable many Korean firms to benefit
from technology transfer. Many US firms could also benefit from strategic
alliances with Korean firms, permitting them to use Korea as a base for
further expansion of their activities in China and other Asian markets. 
For Korea, there is an additional important benefit. An FTA with the
United States would likely accelerate Korea’s ongoing domestic reform
program and stimulate economic growth. Japan also seems to have this
benefit of an FTA in mind in its bilateral FTAs with Mexico and Korea.
Better Management of Economic Relations
Forming an FTA would result in a better economic relationship between
the two countries by reducing bilateral trade frictions and reinforcing
trade and investment linkages. Since an FTA would not only eliminate
tariffs but also lower nontariff barriers, it would lessen many trade fric-
tions between the two governments. This outcome is especially impor-
tant in the bilateral trade in autos, a source of long-standing discord be-
tween the United States and Korea (as noted earlier). In addition, an FTA
would increase investment, which in turn would generate increased trade
through US affiliate companies, as a substantial share of US trade takes
place between parent and subsidiary. Expanding intraindustry trade and
investment would subsequently create vested interests in both countries
for good relations.
Strengthening Security Ties
Aside from the economic benefits of an FTA, the United States and Korea
have another common interest that an FTA could reinforce: a strong secu-
rity relationship. The two countries have been close military allies for the
past 50 years. Forming an FTA not only would bring them much closer in
their economic relations but also could improve the climate for coopera-
tion on political and security issues.
Indeed, political objectives often have driven US participation in FTA
negotiations. The US-Israel FTA was the first and clearest example of this
motive. Congressional support for NAFTA arguably hinged on broad
concerns about immigration and US security interests and democracy in
Central America. Similarly, US support for trade preferences under the
KOREA-US FREE TRADE REVISITED 187
Institute for International Economics  |  www.iie.com
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was tied to the goal of resolving the
migration and drug trafficking problems in that region. More recently, 
the US-Jordan FTA, signed in October 2000, seeks inter alia to strengthen 
the economic foundation for Jordan’s participation in the peace process in
the Middle East.
Strengthening the political and security relationship could turn out
over time to be a much more important benefit of a Korea-US FTA than
the consequent economic gains. The trade pact could be particularly valu-
able as a show of US support for peaceful relations in Northeast Asia and
as a means of ensuring that South Korea has the means to advance that
process. Recently, Korea-US relations have been under strain caused by
the rising anti-American sentiments in Korea and differences between the
two countries on the policy responses to the North Korean nuclear threat.
Such tensions elevate the political risk of doing business in Korea and
thus tend to damp investment (at least in the short run). Moving forward
on an FTA could help to offset these negative factors. Indeed, many APEC
countries, including Korea, seek to deepen trade ties with the United
States as part of a strategy to ensure continued US military engagement in
the region.
Effects on Regional Integration
Should a Korea-US FTA be implemented, it is generally expected that the
increase of US exports to Korea would exceed the increase of Korean
exports to the United States, since US trade barriers are much lower than
those of Korea. As a result, the US trade deficit with Korea should be re-
duced. At the same time, some of the increase in US exports to Korea
would come at the expense of Japanese products currently imported into
Korea. Thus, while Korea’s trade balance with the United States would
worsen, its trade balance with Japan would improve.
Our GTAP model simulations confirm these effects of a Korea-US FTA
on bilateral trade balances. Although the improvement in a bilateral trade
balance does not significantly affect the overall economy, it is important
politically and can influence Korean trade policy for better or worse. Ko-
rean officials believe that a reduction in their trade deficit with Japan and
in the trade surplus with the United States would help them, respectively,
to manage protectionist pressures at home against dominant Japanese
firms and to mitigate US protectionism directed against competitive Ko-
rean exports. Korea has often been under trade pressure because of its
chronic trade surplus with the United States. At the same time, a chronic
and severe trade deficit with Japan has at times led Korea to try to artifi-
cially divert Japanese imports under the “import source diversification
system.” An FTA with the United States could enable Korea to “naturally”
divert the source of imports from Japan to the United States, thereby re-
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aligning its trade imbalances with both countries. From the point of view
of Korean trade officials, it would kill two birds with one stone.10
But that is only part of the story. If a Korea-US FTA were realized, many
economies besides Japan (including Taiwan, China, Mexico, Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada) would be affected by trade diversion in some
sectors (see below). Therefore, a Korea-US FTA would have significant im-
plications for the Asia-Pacific region; indeed, it could promote a band-
wagon effect that would prompt other countries to pursue bilateral FTAs
in the region, especially with the United States. That is what Singapore is
trying to do with its web of bilateral FTAs. Basically, it is attempting to
cobble together a core group of FTAs to revive progress toward a regional
FTA as envisaged by APEC leaders a decade ago. A Korea-US FTA thus
could accelerate the APEC process toward free and open trade and in-
vestment in the region by the Bogor target dates of 2010 and 2020.
Potential Costs of a Korea-US FTA
An FTA between the United States and Korea would have some associ-
ated political costs for both countries as well as economic costs for US and
Korean trading partners due to trade diversion, especially for neighbors
in the Asia-Pacific region. It could also have negative implications for the
WTO and the Doha Round.
Political Costs of Domestic Adjustments
While an FTA between the United States and Korea would yield economic
benefits for both partners, each country would have individual winners
and losers from closer trade integration and each would have to change
long-standing policies that protect politically powerful industries from
foreign competition. Simply put, the benefits from trade would be dis-
tributed unevenly among various sectors of the economy, and those fac-
ing stiffer competition would likely object vocally.
For Korea, the biggest loser would be the agricultural sector. Thus, as in
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the most vocifer-
ous opposition to an FTA with the United States (and to the Doha Round
as well) would likely come from agricultural interests. Korea’s farm sec-
tor is heavily subsidized and not competitive, but it still wields substan-
tial clout in national politics. Korean farmers have disproportionate rep-
resentation in the National Assembly, even though agriculture, forestry,
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and fishing now account for only 5 percent of GDP and involve only 11
percent of the Korean population (down from 48 percent in 1970). How-
ever, because of the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the past
30 years, many in the urban population still have family members resid-
ing in agricultural areas and thus support farm protection and subsidies.
Over time, however, as the agricultural population continues to decline,
these ties—and the political power they lend to the farm sector—are likely
to weaken. Only 6 percent of young workers (aged 20–24) are in farming
today, and almost 70 percent of the agricultural workforce is more than 
50 years old.
Over the near term, agriculture will continue to pose the largest ob-
stacle to free trade talks. Yet without some liberalization of agricultural
protection, Korea may become isolated in international trade talks, and
Korean industries and exporters may lose the chance to lower foreign bar-
riers affecting their products. Changing demographics suggest that Korea
could mitigate at least some of the domestic opposition to farm reforms
by switching from trade protection to income support for Korean farmers.
Indeed, this is the direction taken by European policy aimed at internal re-
form of the region’s common agricultural policy. If the European Com-
mission is successful in its reform agenda, then Korea (and Japan) would
be isolated in opposition in the WTO to farm trade reform.
There is some indication that Korean officials are slowly moving in the
same direction as the Europeans. Faced with unexpectedly strong oppo-
sition by farmers to the Korea-Chile FTA, the Korean government is
proposing a trade adjustment assistance (TAA)–type program for Korean
farmers to be included in its FTA implementation bill. However, if such
subsidies are large enough to mollify the opposition of Korean farmers,
they could very well pressure a government budget already under con-
siderable strain.
For the United States, the main losers from an FTA with Korea would
be some manufacturing industries, notably textiles and apparel, steel, and
electronics. Just like their counterparts in Korea, these US industries
would ask for more subsidies and import relief via antidumping and safe-
guard measures. From Korea’s point of view, support for an FTA with the
United States depends significantly on whether a prospective trade pact
can deal with problems arising from the use of antidumping actions,
countervailing duties, and safeguard measures. Reforms in these areas are
particularly important for the steel and electronics industries, which as
noted earlier have been frequently targeted by the United States.
US political resistance to an FTA with Korea could surface in two ways:
opposition to revisions in US antidumping law and to tariff cuts on tex-
tiles and apparel, and indifference about a deal with a relatively small eco-
nomic payoff. The former could generate strong resistance to a bilateral
trade pact; the latter would likely present only a modest barrier to the
start of prospective negotiations. Antidumping cases are considered by
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many US industries as the first and best line of defense against foreign
unfair trade practices. Thus, many members of the US Congress, includ-
ing strong protrade advocates, might not continue to support US trade
reforms if antidumping actions are not in the trade policy toolbox. In ad-
dition, US industry would probably strongly contest the granting of tar-
iff preferences to Korean textile and apparel exporters in a bilateral FTA.
To be sure, such benefits were granted, albeit grudgingly, to Mexico in
NAFTA, and more recently to Caribbean and African producers in the US
Trade and Development Act of 2000. But a Korea-US FTA would attract
more opposition from US industry for two reasons: the Korean textile and
apparel industry is not integrated with US firms, and many of the Korean
firms are highly competitive.
The wild card in this area is what happens in the Doha Round. The
United States has proposed the elimination of all industrial tariffs by 2015
and a sharp interim reduction in peak tariffs (including those on textiles
and apparel) by 2010. If US objectives are even partially satisfied in the
WTO talks, US industry will likely respond to the new trade liberalization
by demanding greater use of contingent protection measures. Such ac-
tions in turn could exacerbate the already strident disputes over anti-
dumping and countervailing duties.
Trade Diversion
The United States and Korea are, respectively, the largest and the seventh-
largest trading economies in the world (with Japan, the European Union,
Canada, China, and Hong Kong in between). An FTA between the United
States and Korea would have a sizable impact on and numerous implica-
tions for other countries, especially those in the Asia Pacific, that trade
heavily with the United States, Korea, or both. With the formation of an
FTA, partner countries’ exports to each other’s markets would increase, in
part at the expense of reduced imports from third countries that do not
enjoy the duty-free benefits of FTA partners. This trade diversion effect
would be a major concern and cost for countries that are competing with
the United States and Korea and that would lose market share in the US
and Korean economies.
Which countries might be vulnerable to trade diversion caused by a
Korea-US FTA? A look at the import market shares of each country pro-
vides a first-order approximation of countries at risk. In the Korean mar-
ket, Japan and China are the second- and third-largest exporters, after the
United States. In the US market, Canada, Japan, Mexico, the European
Union, and China are the major exporters, followed by Korea.
How vulnerable is trade from these countries? The analysis of export
similarity indices (ESIs)—the similarity in the structure of export com-
modities in comparison to that of the other FTA partner countries—
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indicates that if a Korea-US FTA is formed, Japan and Germany would be
the most likely to suffer from trade diversion in the Korean market, and
Taiwan, Japan, and Mexico would be most likely to suffer from trade di-
version in the US market. Overall, Japan and Taiwan would be most
affected—particularly Japan, because it exports so much to both the
United States and Korea (see Choi and Schott 2001, chapter 5).
The results of sectoral analysis using the revealed comparative advan-
tages (RCAs) of major competing countries indicate that Japan would
probably experience a fall in exports, mostly in the chemical and machin-
ery sectors, with the exception of power-generating and office machines;
Germany, in chemicals and general industrial machines; and Canada,
China, Australia, and New Zealand, in agricultural, food, and raw mate-
rials exports. In the US market, Taiwan would probably suffer from trade
diversion mostly in textile fibers and in office and electrical machinery;
Japan, in rubber products and office and telecommunications machines;
Mexico, in textile fibers, telecommunications, and electrical machinery;
the European Union, in steel products; and Australia and New Zealand,
in textiles, fibers, and steel products. Thus, different countries would feel
different trade diversion effects in different sectors.
The preceding discussion of trade diversion, of course, focuses on the
short-run direct impact of a Korea-US FTA. In the long run, trade diver-
sion would depend on investment, income, and other effects. Nonethe-
less, the simulation results of the GTAP model generally confirm the ex-
pected trade diversion, even in the long run. For example, the simulation
results show that Korea increases imports from the United States but im-
ports less from all other regions. However, the pattern is not so clear in the
case of US imports. Expansion of US income tends to result in increases in
imports from Japan and in some cases from ASEAN countries, Australia,
and New Zealand.
Possible Negative Impact on WTO Negotiations
The pursuit of an FTA between Korea and the United States need not di-
vert attention away from the WTO negotiations. However, a prospective
FTA could have adverse effects on current WTO talks.
First, pursuing an FTA with the United States would highlight the need
to reform Korean agricultural policies and would thus provoke domestic
lobbies in Korea to even stronger resistance against trade liberalization.
The farm lobby does not discriminate between FTAs and multilateral ne-
gotiations; it dislikes them all. Inciting additional domestic opposition to
any trade liberalization accord could make it even harder for Korea to en-
gage in the Doha Round.
Second, if the process of multilateral liberalization stalls, then FTAs
might be given prominence as defensive or fallback strategies. While a
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Korea-US FTA could catalyze other trade pacts through a process of com-
petitive liberalization, as noted above, it could also incite countries to
offset the discrimination against their trade by imposing new contingent
protection measures, creating new discriminatory trading blocs, or both.
Either way, the WTO process would suffer.
Prospects and Recommendations
Balancing the costs and benefits of a Korea-US FTA involves a complex
calculus of economic and political factors. Econometric models suggest
that both countries will gain from a bilateral agreement at the expense of
other important trading partners, especially the European Union, China,
and Japan. For the United States, the potential gain is very small in re-
lation to its $10 trillion economy. Gilbert (2003) calculates the US wel-
fare gain at 0.03 percent of GDP, generated primarily from terms-of-trade
effects associated with preferential treatment in the Korean market. For
Korea, the potential income gain is more significant. Gilbert (2003) fore-
casts welfare gains of almost 0.4 percent of GDP, resulting primarily from
increased efficiency of Korean industries induced by domestic reforms.
However, these welfare gains would be substantially reduced if the FTA
excludes important sectors like agriculture.
Both the United States and Korea have important economic stakes in
the Asia-Pacific region that would be affected by a prospective FTA. The
same holds true if Korea proceeds with FTA talks with Japan or China or
both. Given the complementary pattern of trade among East Asian coun-
tries, FTAs in the region will likely generate significant trade diversion
and thus encourage the negotiation of parallel agreements to counter the
discrimination from other pacts. In short, “competitive liberalization” is
likely to thrive in the APEC region (Bergsten 1996).
In fact, Korea, China, and Japan are already involved in this process of
competitive liberalization. While China and Japan separately pursue an
FTA with ASEAN, Korea may be forced to follow suit to protect its mar-
ket share and trading interests in the region. Preliminary talks already
have begun with Singapore and Thailand on a bilateral basis.
Studies have shown that Korea would gain more from having an FTA
with China and Japan together than from a bilateral FTA with either
China or Japan. In fact, one of the major policy goals of the current Korean
administration under President Roh Moo-hyun is to build Korea as the
economic hub of Northeast Asia—especially as a business center (distri-
bution and financial). Thus, Korea has a strong interest in pursuing a
Northeast Asian (Korea-China-Japan) FTA.
Given the current economic status of Korea, China, and Japan, however,
we are not likely to see a Northeast Asian FTA between these big trading
nations in the near future. First of all, China is not ready for an FTA with
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a more advanced economy such as Japan or Korea. It already is having
some problems in implementing the extensive reforms to which it com-
mitted in its protocols of accession to the WTO, and thus is not likely to
be ready in the near future for the even deeper liberalization and deregu-
lation required by an FTA. Second, Japan and Korea are not ready to open
their markets to increased agricultural imports from China. Witness the
strong resistance by their agricultural lobbies to FTAs with Singapore and
Chile—neither of which is really known as an agricultural powerhouse.
The most likely development in this region over the next several years
would be a bilateral FTA between Korea and Japan. The two countries
have been toying with this idea for the past five years, and they plan to
launch negotiations soon. Japan seems to be more eager to start this un-
dertaking while Korea prefers to form a three-way Northeast Asian FTA.
Despite the economic and noneconomic benefits cited above, the short-
term prospect for an FTA between Korea and the United States is not very
good. The biggest problem remains the agricultural sector in Korea. At-
tempts by the Korean government to mute the opposition of farm groups
by establishing a program to compensate farmers harmed by FTA reforms
have met strong political resistance, and it is not clear whether the imple-
mentation bill will pass the National Assembly. The Roh administration
doesn’t seem to want to take on this domestic political fight. Indeed, when
asked about the possibility of a Korea-US FTA during his visit to Wash-
ington in May 2003, President Roh admitted that the resistance of the agri-
cultural sector would make it difficult for Korea to pursue any FTA. 
The recent rise in nationalism in Korea could also work against a poten-
tial FTA between the United States and Korea. Recall that this was a cen-
tral argument against the launching of Korea-US FTA negotiations in the
late 1980s (see USITC 1989). Fifteen years later, the problem persists. Any
attempt to negotiate an FTA between Korea and the United States would
unavoidably involve the politically sensitive issue of agricultural-sector
reform in Korea, which in turn would likely exacerbate anti-American sen-
timents in Korea among farmers, students, and even some businessmen.
Nevertheless, the two countries must not lose sight of either the sub-
stantial economic benefits that could accrue from an FTA or the positive
spillovers on political and security relations. Thus, Korea and the United
States should pursue an FTA as an important long-term goal. Several steps
should be taken now to better prepare for launching FTA talks in the future.
First, the two countries should increase their efforts to wrap up their ne-
gotiations for a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which has been dead-
locked for the last few years because of the dispute over Korea’s movie
screen quota. Both sides should consider stepping back from their original
demands. The United States should accept an increase in the quota for for-
eign content providers rather than insist on its complete elimination. Korea
should drop its protectionist position and agree to such liberalization.
Given the rapid improvement in the competitiveness of the Korean movie
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industry in recent years, the practical impact on Korean industry of in-
creased foreign competition should be relatively minor. For the last couple
of years, the market share of Korean movies has been higher than the cur-
rent screen quota ratio (40 percent). If the Korean movie industry insists on
further protection, the government could offer some type of nonprice sub-
sidy or safeguard protection. In any event, it is strongly recommended that
the two countries try to sign a BIT as soon as possible. The Korea-US BIT
would be the first step toward an FTA between the two countries.
Second, the general public in Korea is not very well informed about
what an FTA would mean for Korea. Their perceptions are shaped by
what they read in the newspapers about an FTA’s negative impact on the
Korean agricultural sector and what they see in TV news programs about
farmers’ street demonstrations against any such agreement. It therefore is
important for the general public to be more educated and informed about
a possible FTA, particularly about its benefits to other sectors in the econ-
omy and to consumers. In this respect, some actions taken by the US-
Korea Business Council are encouraging. In early 2003, the council estab-
lished a joint task force to draw up active strategies to promote the
successful negotiation of both a BIT and an FTA between the two coun-
tries. But more attention needs to paid to focusing the public debate in
Korea itself on the benefits of as well as the adjustments required in pur-
suing freer trade policies, including through FTA and WTO accords.
Third, both governments should work to contain the rise in anti-
American sentiments in Korea. To some degree, these feelings, which are
not deeply rooted in the society, have been manipulated for political ends
by certain groups using the unfortunate accidental death of two school-
girls killed by a US armored vehicle in 2002 to fan public ire. The two gov-
ernments should take additional steps to prevent tragedies of this type
from adding fuel to anti-American sentiment in Korea. For example, they
could establish a joint investigative team to review all such incidents in
the future. Such reviews would be more credible in the eyes of the Korean
public than the findings of US military tribunals.
In sum, there is a strong economic rationale for moving forward with
negotiations on a comprehensive free trade agreement between Korea
and the United States—but only if agricultural reforms are an integral
part of the deal. Whether the two countries can muster the political sup-
port for dismantling barriers in sensitive sectors is unclear, however. The
decision may turn on how much farm reform is conceded in the WTO’s
Doha Round and on what other Asia-Pacific trading partners do to deepen
regional trade ties. The outcome of the WTO ministerial in Cancún in Sep-
tember 2003 is not encouraging in the first regard, as it demonstrated
Korea’s reluctance to negotiate agricultural reforms. If WTO negotiations
get back on track, then Korean officials will have to decide whether they
can support that deal—and, if so, whether they can go further by offering
more open access to FTA partners. If China and Japan, as well as the
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ASEAN countries, expand their network of bilateral and regional FTAs,
can Korea stand aside? And if those East Asian pacts discriminate against
US exporters, can US trade officials stand aside—or do they insist on bi-
lateral deals of their own? Over time, and perhaps sooner rather than
later, we believe that the two countries will move toward free trade for
both economic and political reasons.
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